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Imperative 42: I-Congress Part 1 of 3: 21st vision: internet referendum Congress versus corruption

    During the Philippines' early independence years (1946-50s) 'facilitation fees' going to 'arrangers' of State contracts and purchases came up to 10% of contract amount.  From 1960s to 70s, the rate rose to 20%, and further went up to 40% in 1980s.  By 1990s to early 2000s, 'facilitation' rates had apparently gone up to scam-level 50 to 100%.  Thankfully, only one large-scale 100% scam had been popularly known: P900 million in State shares of natural gas production going to various politicians purportedly for poverty alleviation and disaster mitigation projects.  30% went to the arranger group, 70% to involved politicians, and zero to the supposed post-typhoon reconstruction projects.  The principal arranger had since been jailed but the stolen money has not been fully recovered except for a few mansions identified as her properties.  Some politicians had been confined but scores of other 'project' beneficiaries (Senators and Congressmen) have gone scot-free due to absence of solid evidence, according to some Congressmen.  Media people and even Congressional investigators have in fact been claiming for decades that such revealed corruption cases were just 'the tip of an enormous iceberg' but evidence is hard to come by, as 'arrangers' have become experts in their trade after decades of practice.  One politician even boasted to a beauty queen that fortunes automatically come to members of Congress who belong to the majority party (such as himself) or have been persuaded to support particular projects. 
    What other revealed scandals indicate unspeakable high-level corruption in the Philippines?  Here are a few, based on media reports: 
    a) Billions of pesos flowed to a Mindanao political clan (out of tax proceeds) as reward for ensuring zero votes  (thru terrorism) for the incumbent politicians' rival candidates.  The clan hence managed to set up and maintain a well-equipped battalion-size private army ostensibly to fight rebels, plus well-appointed mansions and high-end vehicles in a region of destitute micro farmers.  The clan's army facilitated land-grabbing and titling operations for further asset expansions.  The scandals were publicly revealed after the clan's contingent of goons ambushed a convoy of vehicles and massacred the passengers: 23 relatives and supporters of a rival gubernatorial candidate, plus 34 journalists, all out to register the rival as a candidate for the coming elections.  Six years have since passed but few of the 200 charged have been sentenced with finality despite all the glaring evidence.
    b) Half of around P300 billion in funds for supposed co-ops' livelihood projects went to some senators and congressmen at 50%, the 'arranger' group at 35-40%, and 10-15% to co-ops or local governments for show.  Hundreds of supposed co-op members' names were found to have been lifted from the telephone directory, voters' lists and even candidates of State licensure exams to show legitimacy.
    c) Landlords and political elites have created new vote-rich municipalities, cities and provinces which later acquired billions of pesos in endless State budgets out of national tax incomes.  According to one senator, 40-50% of local and national government expenditures usually end up in the pockets of politicians thru contractors' commissions, a great windfall for the said creators of provinces, towns and cities who ensconced themselves or their relatives into top positions of the new local governments. 
    d) $14 million in contractors' commissions 'for the boys' flowed out of a $470 million hydropower rehabilitation contract financed by foreign loans payable by people's taxes.
    e) P2.5 billion in State agricultural loans went to 'ghost' borrowers.  State audit personnel later reported 'beneficiaries' as bankrupt or deceased as claimed by politicians' loan handlers.
    f) P190 million in commissions was allegedly paid to a top politician who ordered P2 billion in State pension company funds for said company's purchase of capital shares of an obscure asset-short company related to gambling interests.  The beneficiary company's shares quickly became worthless after the deal. The politician had also been suspected of being a billion-peso beneficiary of a nationwide illegal gambling syndicate as claimed by his former ally and partly revealed by an impeachment court.  The politician was ousted and confined after massive street protests but was later pardoned by the succeeding president. He has since won a city mayoralty post.  According to observers, his election victory was facilitated by his popularity as a crime-busting character in movies, and his 'most approachable' reputation among the poor masses who compose the city's majority voters.
    g) Billions of pesos spent to construct hundreds of row house units to benefit victims of two typhoons remained unoccupied for years due to cracked walls, leaking roofs, rotting posts, lack of water and power lines, decrepit toilets and interiors, and housing sites atop landslide-prone slopes.  Media sources and contractor company whistle-blowers revealed half of budget going to national level politicians and officials, most of the remainder to main contractors, and a tiny portion (30% or less of standard budgets for row houses) going to sub-contractors, which explains the scandalous substandard nature of the row houses.  Some politicians' solution?  Budget for better sets of row houses, since the first ones are 'unsalvageable' (translation: more 'facilitation' commissions for signatories).  Several years have passed but no one has been charged in court despite media-covered Congressional investigations, and everyone seems to have forgotten about the issue just a few years after revelation of the scandalous events.
    How may we prevent more of such scandals (a mere tip of the Philippine corruption iceberg) in the future?  The next posts reveal very effective methods.
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